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 NOTE 
Wielding the Constitutional Sword: 
Lampley’s Expansion on Evidencing Sexual 
Discrimination 
Lampley v. Mo. Comm’n on Human Rights, No. SC 96828, 2019 WL 925557 
(Mo. Feb. 26, 2019) (en banc) 
Jane Rose* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“The constitutional sword necessarily has two edges: Fair and equal treat-
ment for women means fair and equal treatment for members of [all genders].” 
– Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 19721 
 
 
* Purdue University, B.A., University of Missouri, 2014; J.D. Candidate, University of 
Missouri School of Law, 2019; Managing Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2018–2019.  I 
would like to thank Professor Rigel Oliveri for her wisdom, guidance, and zeal in help-
ing me; and Abigail Williams, Emma Masse, and the rest of the Missouri Law Review 
editors for their assistance and expertise. 
 1. Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Discrimina-
tion Law, 85 N.Y.U L. REV. 83, (2010) (quoting Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 20, 
Moritz v. Comm’r, 469 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1971) (No. 71-1127) (on file with the Li-
brary of Congress, Manuscript Division, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Papers, Container 5, 
Folder: Moritz v. Comm’r [1971])). 
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In 2013, fourth-wave feminism2 crashed through the United States and 
pushed for the political, social, and economic equality of all genders.3  As it 
has moved predominately through social media, it focuses on intersectional 
identities4 that create social inequalities.5  Promoting intersectional identities 
is not a novel movement, but this is the first time it has been at the forefront of 
the feminist movement.  In the last decade, the United States legal system has 
made strides towards equality for the LGBTQ+ community, as gender and in-
tersectional issues have been advanced through repeals of problematic policies 
and judicial interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title 
VII”).  Since 2010, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” was repealed,6 the Defense of 
Marriage Act was struck down,7 the ban on same-sex marriage was deemed 
 
 2. The modern feminist movement is typically divided in four different phases or 
“waves.”  Martha Rampton, Four Waves of Feminism, PAC. UNIV. OR. (Oct. 25, 2015), 
https://www.pacificu.edu/about/media/four-waves-feminism.  The first wave occurred 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, with a focus on women’s suffrage.  
Id.  The second wave started in the 1960s and lasted into the 1990s, focusing on the 
civil rights movements and “growing self-consciousness of a variety of minority 
groups.”  Id.  In the mid-1990s, third wave feminism “tend[ed] to be global, multi-
cultural, and it shun[ned] simple answers or artificial categories of identity, gender, and 
sexuality.”  Id.  However, most third-wavers pushed back against the first two waves 
by rejecting the term “feminism” and refusing to acknowledge a collective movement.  
Id.  Instead, they identified individual struggles.  Id.  The fourth wave emerged to chal-
lenge systematic disadvantages to not only the genders but also to intersectional iden-
tities.  Id.  The fourth wave is the most inclusive in that it breaks the binary and calls 
for gender equality rather than focusing solely on the struggles of women.  Id. 
 3. Id.; see Kira Cochrane, The Fourth Wave of Feminism: Meet the Rebel Women, 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 10, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/10/fourth-
wave-feminism-rebel-women. 
 4. The term “intersectionality” was first coined by Kimberlé Crenshaw in 1989.  
See generally Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: 
A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Anti-
racial Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989).  In her work, Crenshaw argued 
against a “single-axis framework” in analyzing the experiences of those subjected to 
discrimination for multiple aspects of their identity – namely, Black women.  Id. at 
139–40.  Crenshaw noted that focusing on a “single axis” – race or sex – left Black 
women’s interests in the margins of feminist and civil rights movements.  Id. at 152.  
For the purpose of this Note, intersectionality is defined as “the complex, cumulative 
way in which the effects of multiple forms of discrimination (such as racism, sexism, 
and classism) combine, overlap, or intersect especially in the experiences of marginal-
ized individuals or groups.”  Intersectionality, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.mer-
riam-webster.com/dictionary/intersectionality (last visited Mar. 12, 2019). 
 5. Cochrane, supra note 3. 
 6. See Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 
3515 (2010).  
 7. See generally United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013) (striking down 
the Defense of Marriage Act). 
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unconstitutional,8 and the U.S. Courts of Appeal for the Second9 and Seventh 
Circuits held Title VII prohibits workplace discrimination against LGBTQ+ 
employees.10  Further, a number of states have passed legislation expressly for-
bidding discrimination on the basis of gender identity or sexual orientation.11  
As of 2017, several states have legally expanded their definition of gender by 
passing laws to recognize genders outside of the binary spectrum on birth cer-
tificates and driver’s licenses. 12  This progression has come with backlash.13 
Missouri has not been noticeably affected by the push for social reform, 
as evidenced by its repeated failure to adopt sexual orientation or gender iden-
tity as protected characteristics within the Missouri Human Rights Act 
(“MHRA”).14  In 2015, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District 
 
 8. See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (holding that mar-
riage is a fundamental right of which same-sex couples may not be deprived). 
 9. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 132 (2d Cir. 2018) (“In the con-
text of Title VII, the statutory prohibition extends to all discrimination ‘because of . . .  
sex’ and sexual orientation discrimination is an actionable subset of sex discrimina-
tion”). 
 10. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 351–52 (7th Cir. 2017) 
(“[A] person who alleges that she experienced employment discrimination on the basis 
of her sexual orientation has put forth a case of sex discrimination for Title VII pur-
poses.”). 
 11. LGBT Rights Milestones Fast Facts, CNN, 
https://www.cnn.com/2015/06/19/us/lgbt-rights-milestones-fast-facts/index.html (last 
updated Feb. 18, 2019). 
 12. See id. 
 13. The Trump presidential administration has taken positions contrary to the pro-
gression of LGBTQ+ rights – in particular rights of transgender individuals.  This in-
cludes banning transgender individuals “to serve in any capacity in the US Military.”  
Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26, 2017, 8:55 AM EDT), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/890193981585444864; Donald Trump 
(@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26, 2017, 9:04 AM EDT), https://twit-
ter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/890196164313833472; Donald Trump (@real-
DonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26, 2017, 9:08 AM EDT), https://twitter.com/real-
DonaldTrump/status/890197095151546369.  Three federal judges have stunted the im-
plementation of the transgender restriction.   See Government Returns to Supreme Court 
on Military Transgender Ban, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 13, 2018), http://www.sco-
tusblog.com/2018/12/government-returns-to-supreme-court-on-military-transgender-
ban/.  However, on January 22, 2019, the United States Supreme Court held that the 
Trump administration is allowed to continue on with its ban while policy challenges 
move through the court system.  Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Revives Transgender 
Ban for Military Service, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.ny-
times.com/2019/01/22/us/politics/transgender-ban-military-supreme-court.html.   Ad-
ditionally, the DOJ has adopted the interpretation that the Civil Rights Act does not 
cover transgender workers from employment discrimination in all “pending and future 
matters.”  LGBT Rights Milestones Fast Facts, supra note 11. 
 14. See MO. REV. STAT. § 213.010.6 (2016) (defining discrimination for the pur-
poses of the MHRA but failing to include sexual orientation or gender identity as pro-
tected classes). 
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interpreted the MHRA not to include sexual orientation15 and, in 2017, inter-
preted the MHRA not to include gender identity.16  However, in early 2019, 
the Missouri Supreme Court, in reviewing a motion for summary judgment 
decision in Lampley v. Missouri Commission on Human Rights,17 held sexual 
discrimination may be evidenced by sex stereotyping.18  This decision may be 
the key to protecting gender identities and potentially even sexual orientation 
in Missouri. 
The Lampley holding encourages Missouri to create more gender-inclu-
sive workplaces by prohibiting discrimination against individuals for not con-
forming to expected gender roles and moving towards erasing the distinct ex-
pectations and boundaries between genders.  By doing this, Missouri takes a 
step towards gender equality through gender inclusivity: There cannot be 
equality for one gender without advancing equality for all genders.  Sex stere-
otyping may be an indirect way to shield discrimination in the absence of ex-
pressly prohibiting discrimination against gender identity and sexual orienta-
tion. 
Part II of this Note begins by analyzing the surrounding circumstances in 
which the Missouri Supreme Court’s landmark holding in Lampley v. Missouri 
Commission on Human Rights occurred.  Next, this Note explains the relevant 
state and federal legal background to the court’s decision in Part III before ex-
amining its reasoning in Part IV.  This Note discusses the potential outcomes 
of recognizing sex stereotyping as a manifestation of sexual discrimination in 
Missouri, including the effect such recognition would have on the LGBTQ+ 
community, in Part V and concludes in Part VI.  
II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
Harold Lampley (“Lampley”), an employee of the Missouri Department 
of Social Services Child Support Enforcement Division, filed two complaints 
with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights (“MCHR”) – and with the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) per their work share 
 
 15. Pittman v. Cook Paper Recycling Corp., 478 S.W.3d 479, 482–83 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2015) (“Missouri has not enacted legislation prohibiting discrimination against 
homosexuals by adding sexual orientation as a protected status in the [MHRA].”). 
 16. R.M.A. v. Blue Springs R-IV Sch. Dist., No. WD 80005, 2017 WL 3026757 
(Mo. Ct. App. July 18, 2017) (“In enacting the MHRA, the General Assembly did not 
intend ‘discrimination on the grounds of sex’ to include the deprivation of a public 
accommodation . . . because a person is transitioning from female to male.”), rev’d on 
other grounds No. SC 96683, 2019 WL925511 (Mo. Feb. 26, 2019) (en banc). 
 17. No. SC 96828, 2019 WL 925557 (Mo. 2019) (en banc). 
 18. See id. at *6–7. 
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agreement19 – against his employer in 2014.20  Lampley alleged he was dis-
criminated against on the basis of his sex21 and that his employer violated sec-
tions 213.055(1)22 and 213.070(2)23 of the MHRA.24  Lampley’s employer al-
legedly discriminated against him because Lampley’s comportment and ap-
pearance did not coincide with his manager’s and employer’s views of stereo-
typical masculinity.25  Originally Lampley’s complaint provided no specific 
discriminatory conduct, but he later amended his charge.26  Further, Lampley 
 
 19. The MCHR and the EEOC have a work-share agreement to cooperate with 
each other in the claims filing process.  Robert L. Ortbals, Jr., Missouri Supreme Court 
Allows Employees to Proceed with Discrimination Lawsuits Based on Untimely Filed 
Charges of Discrimination, LITTER (Sept. 5, 2013), https://www.littler.com/missouri-
supreme-court-allows-employees-proceed-discrimination-lawsuits-based-untimely-
filed-charges.  The agency that the individual files the complaint with will retain the 
complaint for investigation but will also file the complaint with the other agency.  Fair 
Employment Practices Agencies and Dual Filing, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/em-
ployees/fepa.cfm (last visited Mar. 12, 2019) [hereinafter EEOC, Dual Filing].  Typi-
cally, these types of arrangements dictate each agency will abide by the findings of the 
investigating agency.  See, e.g., Wilson Elser, The Impact of Federal-State “Work-
Sharing Agreements”, LEXOLOGY (June 14, 2013), https://www.lexology.com/li-
brary/detail.aspx?g=130c6649-afd3-4852-942c-fbaec8c4fb6a. 
 20. Lampley v. Mo. Comm’n on Human Rights, No. WD 80288, 2017 WL 
4779447, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2017), aff’d, No. SC 96828, 2019 WL 925557 
(Mo. Feb. 26, 2019) (en banc). 
 21. Id. 
 22. According to section 213.055 of the Missouri Revised Statutes, 
 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice: 
(1) For an employer, because of the race, color, religion, national origin, 
sex, ancestry, age or disability of any individual: 
(a) To fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, national origin, sex, ancestry, age or disability; 
(b) To limit, segregate, or classify his employees or his employment appli-
cants in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of 
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
ployee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, national origin, 
sex, ancestry, age or disability [. . . .] 
 
MO. REV. STAT. § 213.055 (2016). 
 23. It is unlawful “[t]o retaliate or discriminate in any manner against any other 
person because such person has opposed any practice prohibited by this chapter or be-
cause such person has filed a complaint.”  MO. REV. STAT. § 213.072 (2016). 
 24. Lampley, 2017 WL 4779447, at *1. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See Lampley v. Mo. Comm’n on Human Rights, No. SC 96828, 2019 WL 
925557, at *10–11 (Mo. Feb. 26, 2019) (en banc) (Wilson, J., concurring). 
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alleged retaliation because his employer severely underscored him on a perfor-
mance evaluation after he filed his complaint.27  Months later, Rene Frost 
(“Frost”), a co-worker of Lampley, filed discrimination charges against her 
employer under section 213.070(4),28 alleging her employer retaliated against 
her because of her close relationship with Lampley.29 
After an examination of the complaint, the MCHR ended its investigation 
into Lampley and Frost’s claims.30  The MCHR refused to proceed further with 
an investigation because it believed the discrimination alleged was based on 
sexual orientation – not on the basis of sex – over which it does not have juris-
diction.31  Lampley’s petition insisted the discrimination was based on his sex 
and not his sexual orientation.32  Lampley filed his claim explicitly for discrim-
ination on the basis of sex – a fact the court ignored.33  The MCHR also closed 
Frost’s investigation because discrimination and retaliation against an em-
ployee due to her association with someone who is in the LGBTQ+ community 
is not prohibited by the MHRA.34  Lampley and Frost both petitioned the court 
for an administrative review of the termination of the investigations and, alter-
natively, a mandamus for a right-to-sue letter.35  The Honorable Patricia S. 
Joyce of the Circuit Court of Cole County presided over the petitions.36  It was 
at this point Lampley and Frost’s claims were consolidated.37  The MCHR and 
Lampley filed cross-motions for summary judgment.38 
 
 27. Id.  
 28. “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer, employment 
agency, labor organization, or place of public accommodation: . . . [t]o discriminate in 
any manner against any other person because of such person’s association with any 
person protected by this chapter.”  MO. REV. STAT. § 213.070(4) (2016). 
 29. Lampley, 2017 WL 4779447, at *1. 
 30. See id.  This subsequently ended the EEOC’s involvement with the investiga-
tion as well.  The MCHR and the EEOC have contracted a “work-sharing agreement,” 
which means that the organization that the individual files the complaint with will retain 
the complaint for processing but also files the charge with the other organization.  
EEOC, Dual Filing, supra note 19.  It seems as though Lampley filed his complaint 
with the MCHR, which led the processing procedures and filed the complaint with the 
EEOC.  See Lampley, 2017 WL 4779447, at *1.  When the MCHR ended its investiga-
tion, a charging party has fifteen days to appeal to the EEOC.  EEOC, Dual Filing, 
supra note 19.  There is no indication that Lampley appealed the MCHR’s decision to 
the EEOC. 
 31. Lampley, 2017 WL 4779447, at *1. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Brief of Respondents at 4, Lampley, No. WD80288, 2017 WL 4779447 (Mo. 
Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2017), 2017 WL 2874293, at *4. 
 35. Lampley, 2017 WL 4779447, at *1. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Brief of Respondents, supra note 34, at 4. 
 38. Appellants’ Amended Brief Submitted by Petitioners/Appellants Harold 
Lampley and Rene Frost at 5, Lampley v. Mo. Comm’n on Human Rights, No. 
WD80288, 2017 WL 4779447 (Mo. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2017), 2017 WL 1374156, at *5 
[hereinafter Appellants’ Amended Brief]. 
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Lampley and Frost insisted their claims were valid sexual discrimination 
claims under a sex stereotyping theory.39  Specifically, the employer’s stereo-
typical perceptions led Lampley’s employer to interact with and treat him dif-
ferently than it would treat other employees who fit inside its stereotypical 
norms.40  Lampley did not cite any specific conduct in the summary judgment 
appeal nor in his appellate brief that illustrated his or the employer’s behav-
ior.41  Lampley acknowledged Missouri had not yet recognized sex stereotyp-
ing as a viable manifestation of sex discrimination but insisted Missouri should 
look to the federal system because the MHRA and Title VII have nearly iden-
tical language and the United States Supreme Court has found sex stereotyping 
as a valid basis for sex discrimination claims.42 
The MCHR countered that the United States Supreme Court had never 
supported the assertion of sex stereotyping as evidence of sex-based discrimi-
nation, and it remained a minority view amongst federal courts.43  The MCHR 
also argued the MHRA “is not merely a reiteration of Title VII” but rather is 
distinctly situated.44  The MCHR concluded sex stereotyping would be used as 
a way to “bootstrap” sexual orientation claims into the MHRA’s protection and 
explained it contradicts Missouri’s legislative intent, as the MHRA is clear and 
unambiguous as to what it prohibits.45 
The trial court ruled in favor of the MCHR and found the complaint al-
leged discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, which is not prohibited 
under Missouri law.46  However, on appeal, the Western District found Lamp-
ley’s sexual orientation coincidental to the claim – not the basis of the discrim-
ination – because nothing in his complaint suggested the complaint was for 
discrimination against Lampley on the basis of his sexual orientation.47  Ulti-
mately, it held sex stereotyping is a valid theory of sexual discrimination that 
can satisfy the fourth element of prima facie sex discrimination under Missouri 
law.48  The court overturned the grant of summary judgment, remanded the 
case, and directed the trial court to issue right-to-sue letters.49 
 
 39. Id. at 7. 
 40. Lampley, 2017 WL 4779447, at *1. 
 41. Id.; see Appellants’ Amended Brief, supra note 38, at 19–20. 
 42. Appellants’ Amended Brief, supra note 38, at 8–11. 
 43. Brief of Respondents, supra note 34, at 32–36. 
 44. Id. at *25–26. 
 45. Id. at *26–27. 
 46. Lampley v. Mo. Comm’n on Human Rights, No. WD 80288, 2017 WL 
4779447, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2017), aff’d, No. SC 96828, 2019 WL 925557 
(Mo. Feb. 26, 2019) (en banc). 
 47. Id. at *2. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at *5. 
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Around six months after the Western District’s opinion was released, the 
Missouri Supreme Court granted MCHR’s motion for transfer.50  Oral argu-
ments commenced on April 25, 2018, but it was not until almost one year 
later that the Missouri Supreme Court handed down its opinion.51  Ultimately, 
the Missouri Supreme Court reached the same conclusion as the Western Dis-
trict – reversing, remanding, and instructing the trial court that Lampley and 
Frost should be issued right-to-sue letters – but the court did not do so uni-
fied.52  Four opinions were filed: a principal, a concurrence, a partial concur-
rence and partial dissent, and a dissent.53  The principal reached the same 
conclusion as the Western District: Sex stereotyping may satisfy the fourth el-
ement of a prima facie case of sex discrimination.54  However, the concur-
rence did not believe the analysis should reach that question because the ulti-
mate facts were already sufficient to satisfy a sex discrimination claim.55 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Sex stereotyping is not a new theory in discrimination law, although it is 
a fresh concept in Missouri precedent.  Before discussing the history of sex 
discrimination and Lampley’s effect, it is important to establish relevant 
LGBTQ+ terminology to help frame the following discussion.  This terminol-
ogy framework is found in Section A.  To better understand future effects of 
Lampley, Section B traces the history of sex-based discrimination, including 
the MHRA’s sex-based discrimination elements and manifestations, and then 
analyzes federal precedent of sex stereotyping.  The Note then shifts towards 
an LGBTQ+ focus by analyzing current protections for the LGBTQ+ commu-
nity against discrimination in Section C, focusing on protections at both the 
federal and state levels.  Finally, this Part concludes with a brief overview of 
the relationship between feminism and the LGBTQ+ community in Section D 
before transitioning to discuss Lampley’s promotion of feminist ideals by en-
couraging erasure of gender barriers in Part IV. 
 
 50. Lampley v. Mo. Comm’n on Human Rights, No. SC 96828, 2019 WL 925557 
(Mo. Feb. 26, 2019) (en banc); Case Summaries for April 25, 2018, MO. CTS., 
https://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=123145 (last visited Mar. 31, 2019). 
 51. Id.  The Missouri Supreme Court also accepted a transfer of R.M.A. v. Blue 
Springs R-IV Sch. Dist., No. SC 96683, 2019 WL 925511 (Mo. Feb. 26, 2019) (en banc) 
and even heard oral arguments on the same day as Lampley. 
 52. See generally id. 
 53. Id. at *7. 
 54. Id. at *6–7. 
 55. Id. at *8 (Wilson, J., concurring). 
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A. Terminology 
Before discussing sex-based discrimination and the LGBTQ+56 commu-
nity, this Section provides a brief overview of relevant terms vital to under-
standing further discourse.  These terms are by no means exclusive definitions 
but rather are short summaries of widely accepted definitions. 
In modern colloquialism, sex and gender are often viewed as synony-
mous.57  Even the United States Supreme Court has used the terms interchange-
ably.58  These terms are related but distinct.59  Sex is often described as a “bi-
ological category” of sex designations of male, female, or intersex60 and based 
on a range of criteria.61  Gender is societally imposed attitudes, feelings, and 
expectations of masculine and feminine roles.  When an individual’s gender is 
“compatible” with society’s expectations, they62 are considered “gender-nor-
mative.”  Gender identity is an individual’s internal sense of their gender not 
 
 56. LGBTQ+ is used to denote a collection of sexual orientations and gender iden-
tities outside of the heterosexual/ gender normative realm.  Anjali Sareen Nowakowski, 
What Does The + In LGBTQ+ Stand For?, ELITE DAILY (June 8, 2017), 
https://www.elitedaily.com/life/culture/what-is-plus-in-lgbtq/1986910.  It stands for 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer.  ‘+’ is used to include all other identities 
whose acronym has not been expressly listed.  Id.  “[T]he extended acronym 
LGBTQQIAP2 stands for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans, Queer, Questioning, Intersex, 
Asexual, Pansexual, and Two-Spirit.”  LGBTQ+ Terminology, FLA. CMTY. HEALTH 
WORKER COAL., http://floridachw.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/lgbtq-terminol-
ogy.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2019). 
 57. See Sandi Farrell, Reconsidering the Gender-Equality Perspective for Under-
standing LGBT Rights, 13 L. & SEXUALITY 605, 612 (2004). 
 58. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (examining the constitution-
ality of using peremptory challenges to strike jurors based on gender).  But see id. at 
156–57 & n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I shall refer to the issue as sex discrimination 
rather than (as the Court does) gender discrimination.  The word ‘gender’ has acquired 
the new and useful connotation of cultural or attitudinal characteristics (as opposed to 
physical characteristics) distinctive to the sexes.”). 
 59. Skylar Davidson, Gender Inequality: Nonbinary Transgender People in the 
Work Place 4 (2016) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Massachusetts Amherst), 
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1331&context=mas-
ters_theses_2. 
 60. See Farrell, supra note 57, at 614.  “Biologist Anne Fausto-Sterling has argued 
for the recognition of five sexes, the three ‘intermediate’ ones being drawn from the 
classification of persons with some mixture of male and female characteristics that we 
refer to as ‘intersexed.’”  Id. 
 61. Davidson, supra note 59, at 4.  Some of the factors include, but are not limited 
to, “chromosomes, hormones, and genitalia.”  Id. 
 62. The author has made a conscious decision to utilize the third person singular 
neutral “they” instead of using gendered terms in this Note.  To learn more about gender 
inclusive language, see Gender-Inclusive Language, THE WRITING CTR., https://writ-
ingcenter.unc.edu/tips-and-tools/gender-inclusive-language/ (last visited Mar. 12, 
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visible to others,63 while gender expression is the external manifestation of 
gender, including pronouns, clothing, and behaviors that society categories as 
more masculine or feminine.64 
Like sex,65 gender is often conceptualized by western societies as only 
having two categories, male and female; this is known as the gender binary.66  
There are many terms individuals who do not fall within the binary use to de-
scribes themselves – and each have distinct and separate meanings – but for 
the purpose of this Note, the term non-binary will be used, as it is one of the 
most common self-described terms.67  Non-binary individuals have lived in the 
United States since the formation of the nation.  Around the world, there are a 
number of cultures that recognize more genders than the binary.68  However, it 
has not been until recently that some states have begun to legally recognize the 
rights of non-binary genders.69  As of 2017, several states have legally ex-
panded their definition of gender to recognize genders outside of the binary 
spectrum by passing laws to recognize non-binary genders on birth certificates 
and driver’s licenses.70 
Non-binary gender identities tend to – but do not always – fall within the 
larger umbrella term of transgender, which refers to people whose gender iden-
tity does not correspond with the gender they were assigned at birth.71  Often 
transgender individuals seek to align their gender expression – how they look 
– with their gender identity – who they really are – rather than the gender they 
 
2019); see also Corinne Werder, 6 Easy Ways to be Gender Inclusive with Your Lan-
guage, GOMAG (Feb. 13, 2019), http://gomag.com/article/6-easy-ways-gender-inclu-
sive-lanuage/. 
 63. Glossary of Terms – Transgender, GLAAD, https://www.glaad.org/refer-
ence/transgender (last visited Mar. 12, 2019). 
 64. “External manifestations of gender, expressed through a person’s name, pro-
nouns, clothing, haircut, behavior, voice, and/or body characteristics.  Society identifies 
these cues as masculine and feminine, although what is considered masculine or femi-
nine changes over time and varies by culture.”  Id. 
 65. Sex is often portrayed as a binary; however, many scientific scholars under-
stand sex as a spectrum – not a binary – because various gene expressions, “chance 
events in development,” genetic variation, and other factors leave individuals outside 
of the binary categories.  Claire Ainsworth, Sex Redefined, NATURE (Feb. 18, 2015), 
https://www.nature.com/news/sex-redefined-1.16943#/spectrum.  It is estimated that 
as many as one in 100 individuals does not fit within the sex binary.  See id.  However, 
further discussion on this matter is beyond the scope of this Note. 
 66. “The idea that there are only two genders is sometimes called a ‘gender binary’ 
because binary means ‘having two parts’ (male and female).”  NAT’L CTR. FOR 
TRANSGENDER EQUAL., UNDERSTANDING NON-BINARY PEOPLE: HOW TO BE 
RESPECTFUL AND SUPPORTIVE, https://transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/re-
sources/Understanding-Non-Binary-July-2016_1.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2019). 
 67. Id. 
 68. See id. 
 69. LGBT Rights Milestones Fast Facts, supra note 11. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Glossary of Terms – Transgender, supra note 63; see also Davidson, supra 
note 59, at 4. 
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were assigned at birth.72  “Cisgender” is the term used to describe individuals 
whose gender identity matches their gender assigned at birth.73  It is important 
to note “transgender” and “cisgender” are both adjectives – not nouns. 
Gender identity is not indicative of a person’s sexual orientation.  “Sexual 
orientation” is the “pattern of a person’s attraction to others.”74  Both 
transgender individuals and cisgender individuals may identify as any sexual 
orientation.75  Over time, lesbian women and gay men have been assumed to 
fall into certain stereotypes.76  Lesbian women are often depicted and associ-
ated with masculine qualities,77 while gay men are often depicted as more fem-
inine.78 
B. Sex-Based Discrimination 
Missourians are protected from employment discrimination at the state 
level by the MHRA and at the federal level by Title VII.  The MHRA was 
codified in 1959 to create the MCHR and provisions to protect Missourians 
from discrimination.79  The mission of the MCHR is to “develop, recommend, 
and implement ways to prevent and eliminate discrimination . . . through en-
forcement of the [MHRA].”80  Originally, the MHRA only prohibited discrim-
ination on the basis of race, but in 1978, an amendment to the MHRA prohib-
ited sex-based discrimination at the state level.81  During the lack of state cov-
erage, Missourians were protected at the federal level by Title VII.82 
 
 72. Glossary of Terms – Transgender, supra note 63. 
 73. Davidson, supra note 59, at 3. 
 74. Id. at 4. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Farrell, supra note 57, at 618. 
 77. More masculine gender identities/expression are often referred to as “butch.”  
Sam Killerman, Comprehensive* List of LGBTQ+ Vocabulary Definitions, ITS 
PRONOUNCED METRO SEXUAL (Jan. 7, 2013), https://www.itspronouncedmetrosex-
ual.com/2013/01/a-comprehensive-list-of-lgbtq-term-definitions/# (last updated Mar. 
13, 2019). 
 78. A more feminine gender expression/identity is also known as “femme.”  Id. 
 79. Ellen Henrion, Note, What’s Missing? Addressing the Inadequate LGBT Pro-
tections in the Missouri Human Rights Act, 81 MO. L. REV. 1173, 1176 (2016). 
 80. About the Human Rights Commission, DEP’T LABOR & INDUS. RELATIONS, 
https://labor.mo.gov/MOHUMANRIGHTS (last visited Mar. 12, 2019). 
 81. MO. REV. STAT. § 213.010 (1959); id. § 213.010 (1978). 
 82. Seven years later, the United States Congress enacted the Civil Rights Acts of 
1964, which included Title VII, a provision that expanded on the guarantees in the 
Fourteenth Amendment to provide protection against employment discrimination “be-
cause of . . . race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000-e (2012). 
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Currently, Missouri courts generally find that the MHRA and Title VII 
are “coextensive, but not identical,” despite being created fairly contempora-
neously and having similar – if not identical – language.83  In spite of this, 
Missouri courts utilize Title VII cases to interpret analogous MHRA statutes; 
however, if the court finds the language of the MHRA statute clear and unam-
biguous, the court need not rely on contrary Title VII case law.84 
This Section first analyzes sex-based discrimination in Missouri under the 
MHRA.  Because of the non-existent precedent of sex stereotyping in sex dis-
crimination cases in Missouri prior to Lampley, this Section then focuses on 
the sex stereotyping precedent in federal cases. 
1. Missouri 
Missouri recognizes several actions as manifestations of sex-based dis-
crimination, including pregnancy-based discrimination, compensation-based 
discrimination, and sexual harassment.85  Missouri courts have found that all 
of these manifestations can satisfy the elements of sex-based discrimination, 
which are “1) the employee belonged to a protected class; 2) . . . was qualified 
to perform his or her job; 3) . . . suffered an adverse employment action; and 
4) . . . was treated differently from similarly situated member of the opposite 
sex.”86  The fourth element may also be satisfied if an employee provides evi-
dence that can give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.87  Once the 
elements of prima facie sex-based discrimination have been satisfied, the bur-
den shifts to the employer “to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason 
for [its] action.”88 
Before Lampley, stereotyping had never been used successfully in Mis-
souri sex-based discrimination cases.89  However, stereotyping has been held 
as a permissible way to evidence age discrimination by the Missouri Court of 
 
 83. Pittman v. Cook Paper Recycling Corp., 478 S.W.3d 479, 485 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2015) (quoting Brady v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 213 S.W.3d 101, 112 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2006)). 
 84. Brief of Respondents, supra note 34, at 26. 
 85. Sex Discrimination & Harassment, DEP’T LABOR & INDUS. RELATIONS, 
https://labor.mo.gov/mohumanrights/Discrimination/sex (last visited Mar. 12, 2019). 
 86. Lampley v. Mo. Comm’n on Human Rights, No. WD 80288, 2017 WL 
4779447, at *3 (Mo. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2017), aff’d, No. SC 96828, 2019 WL 925557 
(Mo. Feb. 26, 2019) (en banc). 
 87. Id. (quoting Buchheit, Inc. v. Mo. Comm’n on Human Rights, 215 S.W.3d 
268, 277 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007)). 
 88. Buchheit, Inc., 215 S.W.3d at 277 (quoting Valle Ambulance Dist. v. Mo. 
Comm’n on Human Rights, 748 S.W.3d 710, 711 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)). 
 89. See Midstate Oil Co. v. Mo. Comm’n on Human Rights, 679 S.W.2d 842, 847 
(Mo. 1984) (en banc).  “Neither the statute setting forth our scope of review . . . nor our 
case law require us to defer to the Commission’s gratuitous commentary regarding what 
is deemed to be respondent’s ‘obsolete and stereotyped ideas.’”  Id. 
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Appeals for the Western District in Ferguson v. Curators of Lincoln Univer-
sity.90 
2. Stereotyping as Evidence of Discrimination in Federal Court Prece-
dent 
As there is no use of sex stereotyping in Missouri, this Note traces the 
application of sex stereotyping claims in sex discrimination cases in the federal 
sphere.  First, this Note examines early uses of sex stereotyping in equal pro-
tection claims before discussing the landmark case Price Waterhouse v. Hop-
kins that brought stereotyping to employment discrimination at the federal 
level.91  This Section concludes with an overview of Price Waterhouse’s leg-
acy and its effect on the LGBTQ+ community. 
a. Sex Stereotyping in Equal Protection Claims 
The sex stereotyping theory in the United States did not appear overnight 
but rather was the culmination of several efforts to bring gender equality to the 
legal system.92  The Honorable Ruth Bader Ginsburg and other legal femi-
nists93 began challenging the constitutionality of sex-based discrimination in 
the early 1970s.94  Before then, the United States Supreme Court narrowly in-
terpreted discrimination and typically found unlawful discrimination only in 
the context of race.95 
Before she was a Justice, Ginsburg took up the sex stereotyping principle 
in the 1970s when she first challenged the constitutionality of sex-based dis-
crimination in Moritz v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.96  Controversially, 
Ginsburg used a male plaintiff to push feminist ideals.97  This was not a blunder 
but rather a strategic move to expand sex discrimination by creating a new ap-
proach to promote equal protection.98  She articulated in the Moritz brief that 
“the constitutional sword necessarily has two edges.  Fair and equal treatment 
 
 90. 498 S.W.3d 481, 492 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) (holding that when an employer 
acted on an age-based stereotype in making its decision, it is enough for a jury to infer 
that the employer acted on the basis of the employee’s age). 
 91. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 92. See Franklin, supra note 1, at 120. 
 93. One of the notable feminists is Pauli Murray, the pioneer who first used anti-
serotyping arguments to develop an equal protection approach to sex discrimination.  
Id. at 119.  She began asserting in the mid-1960s that not all sex-based action neces-
sarily created a constitutional issue – just when it “perpetuated stereotypes that forced 
the sexes into separate spheres.”  Id. at 120. 
 94. Id. at 119. 
 95. Id. 
 96. 469 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1971); Franklin, supra note 1, at 121. 
 97. Franklin, supra note 1, at 91. 
 98. Id. at 92. 
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for women means fair and equal treatment for members of [all genders].”99  
Justice Ginsburg departed from more radical feminists using this theory, as her 
goal was not to “annihilate sex roles” nor “eliminat[e] . . . sex distinction itself” 
but rather to cease the enforcement of those roles by the states.100 
By the late 1970s, the sex stereotyping theory had firm roots in the Court’s 
understanding and interpretation of equal protection.101  However, the feminist 
movement was in retreat as the Equal Rights Amendment (“ERA”) was under 
attack.102  Those who opposed the ERA asserted the sex stereotyping theory 
would be used to find sexual orientation as a manifestation of sex discrimina-
tion, which would destroy traditional sex and family roles.103  The ERA oppos-
ers and others at the time believed it would be a travesty to grant equality to 
the LGBTQ+ community.104 
Rather than defending the LGBTQ+ community and push for equality for 
all, the majority of the feminist movement abandoned the sex stereotyping the-
ory and denied equality or protection to the LGBTQ+ community.105  This in-
ternal conflict between the women’s movement, plus the enclosing opposition 
to gender equality, contributed to the sex stereotyping movement fizzling 
out.106  The theory expanded no further than challenging the male bread win-
ning model.107  However, in 1989, the sex stereotyping model transcended to 
employment law and Title VII with Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.108 
b. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 
The sex stereotyping method to prove sex-based discrimination seeped 
into Title VII in the 1989 United States Supreme Court decision of Price Wa-
terhouse v. Hopkins.109  The plaintiff in the case was Ann Hopkins, an em-
ployee at a nationwide professional accounting partnership, Price Water-
house.110  Ann worked in the Price Waterhouse Office of Government Services 
in Washington, D.C., for five years before the partners in her office proposed 
her as a candidate for partnership to the entirety of Price Waterhouse part-
ners.111  At the time, there were 662 partners, only seven of whom were 
 
 99. Id. 
 100. Franklin, supra note 1, at 121. 
 101. Id. at 138. 
 102. Id. at 139–40. 
 103. Id. at 140. 
 104. See id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See id. at 141. 
 107. Id. at 141–42. 
 108. 490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded by Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized by Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 222–23. 
 111. Id. at 233. 
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women.112  There were eighty-eight candidates, and Ann was the only 
woman.113  The partners in Ann’s office prepared a statement supporting her 
candidacy and praising her performance, accomplishments, and character.114 
During the proposal process, the partners were allowed to comment on 
each candidate, and those comments were then submitted to the firm’s Admis-
sions Committee.115  The Admissions Committee then made a recommendation 
to accept the candidate for partnership, place the candidate on hold, or deny the 
candidate the partnership.116  During Ann’s review, thirteen partners supported 
her bid, three recommended a hold, and eight stated they did not know enough 
to make an opinion.117  Despite her above-average performance, eight partners 
recommended a denial of partnership.118  Ultimately, the Admissions Commit-
tee recommended that Ann’s candidacy for partnership be placed on hold.119 
There were obvious signs that some of the partners reacted poorly to 
Ann’s personality because she was a woman: Had she been a man, she might 
have been praised for similar behavior.120  The reviews called her “macho”; 
mentioned she “overcompensated for being a woman”; advised her she needed 
“a course at charm school”; criticized her because she used profanities, which 
was uncouth “because it’s a lady using foul language”; and more.121  When 
Ann asked why she was placed on hold, the Policy Board’s representative told 
her that in order to improve her chances at partnership, she should “walk more 
femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have 
her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”122  Despite being called “an outstanding 
professional” with a “strong character, independence and integrity,” Ann was 
faulted for not fitting a stereotype of how she should behave.123  Ann then 
brought suit for discrimination on the basis of sex.124 
At the trial court level, the court held Price Waterhouse had unlawfully 
discriminated against Ann on the basis of her sex “by consciously giving cre-
dence and effect to partners’ comments that resulted from sex stereotyping.”125  
The court of appeals affirmed this conclusion.126  The United States Supreme 
Court granted certiorari.127 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 233–34. 
 115. Id. at 232. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 233. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 235. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 234–35. 
 124. Id. at 231–32. 
 125. Id. at 237. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 232. 
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In evaluating the claim, the Court used the statutory language of Title VII 
to determine that it was Congress’ intent that “gender must be irrelevant to 
employment decisions.”128  Later, it showcased that employers acting on a sex 
stereotyping belief have in fact acted on the basis of the individual’s gender.129  
To succeed in a sex discrimination claim, the plaintiff must prove the employer 
relied on gender while making a decision.130  Showing stereotypical remarks 
alone are not enough; rather, the plaintiff must show gender played a part in 
the action.131  Ann demonstrated some of the evaluations from the firm’s part-
ners were made based on sex stereotyping.132  Because there was evidence the 
firm relied on the comments in those evaluations to make its decision, it could 
be used to illustrate it played a motivating part in an employment decision.133  
Thus, it could be used to show unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex.134  
The Court held stereotyping on the basis of sex is sex discrimination.135 
c. Post-Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 
Price Waterhouse’s holding expanded the accepted manifestations to 
prove unlawful Title VII sex discrimination to include sex stereotyping.  How-
ever, it did not gain traction quickly.  A decade after Price Waterhouse, the 
United States Supreme Court once again expanded sex discrimination in On-
cale v. Sundowner Offshore Services136 and found that same-sex harassment is 
sex discrimination under Title VII.137  Justice Antonin G. Scalia, who wrote 
the majority opinion, noted, 
As some courts have observed, male-on-male sexual harassment in 
the workplace was assuredly not the principal evil Congress was 
concerned with when it enacted Title VII.  But statutory prohibitions 
often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable 
evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the 
principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed. Title 
VII prohibits “discriminat[ion] . . . because of . . . sex” in the “terms” 
or “conditions” of employment.  Our holding that this includes sex-
ual harassment must extend to sexual harassment of any kind that 
meets the statutory requirements.138 
 
 128. Id. at 240. 
 129. Id. at 250. 
 130. Id. at 251. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 256. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
 137. Id. at 82.  
 138. Id. at 79–80 (emphasis added). 
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Justice Scalia’s expansion coupled with the sex stereotyping theory 
kicked sex discrimination cases into action.  Since the turn of the millennium, 
multiple major cases have advanced LGBTQ+ rights throughout the federal 
circuit courts. 
Only a year after Oncale, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
became the first circuit court to rule that Title VII extended to gender identity 
discrimination through a sex stereotyping theory in Schwenk v. Hartford139 and 
that any precedent holding otherwise was overruled by Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins.140  In 2000, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in Rosa v. 
Park West Bank & Trust Co., found that a transgender woman who was denied 
a credit application because the establishment acted upon the belief Rosa’s at-
tire did not match what the establishment thought her gender should be to have 
a valid claim under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act by citing Title VII case 
law.141 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recognized gender iden-
tity may be protected by Title VII in Smith v. City of Salem in 2004, as Title 
VII prohibits discrimination against a transgender individual based on stereo-
typing.142  Within the next decade, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit followed suit in Glenn v. Brumbly143 and affirmed its position that sex 
discrimination under Title VII “includes discrimination against a transgender 
person for gender nonconformity” in Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales.144  
As of April 2019, discrimination based on gender identity has only been pro-
tected from sex-based discrimination under Title VII by failing to conform to 
gender stereotypes. 
Since 2013, judicial recognition of discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation as a manifestation of sex-based discrimination has expanded signif-
icantly.  In 2014, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia Circuit 
found that Title VII does not explicitly protect discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation but that a claim could be brought with a sex stereotyping 
theory under a sex-based discrimination claim because the plaintiff’s sexual 
orientation did not conform to stereotypical gender roles.145  In 2017, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found in Christiansen v. Omnicom 
Group, Inc. that “gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals do not have less pro-
tection under Price Waterhouse against traditional gender stereotype discrimi-
nation than do heterosexual individuals” and allowed a gay man to utilize a sex 
stereotyping theory in a sex discrimination claim.146  Also in 2017, the U.S. 
 
 139. 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 140. Id. at 1201–02. 
 141. 214 F.3d 213, 215–16 (1st Cir. 2000). 
 142. 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 143. 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 144. Id. at 1316–17; Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales, LLC, 641 F. App’x 883, 
884 (11th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). 
 145. See Terveer v. Billington, 34 F. Supp. 3d 100 (D.D.C. 2014). 
 146. 852 F.3d 195, 200–01 (2d. Cir. 2017) (alterations in original).  
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Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Hively v. Ivy-Tech Community Col-
lege of Indiana147 and the Second Circuit in Zarda v. Altitude Express Inc.148 
each held that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of sex 
discrimination.  The rationale is summarized best by Zarda, which found any 
non-heterosexual orientation “represents the ultimate case of failure to conform 
to gender stereotypes.”149   
Hively and Zarda created a circuit split with the Eleventh Circuit’s deci-
sion in Evans v. Georgia Regional, which held “[d]ischarge for homosexuality 
is not prohibited by Title VII” in early 2017.150  The United States Supreme 
Court has denied certiorari in Evans, while Hively and Zarda have not peti-
tioned the Court for certiorari.151 
C. LGBTQ+ Discrimination Protections in Place 
Both federal and state governments have had neither a protective nor pos-
itive relationship with the LGBTQ+ community.  Rather, the government has 
often persecuted individuals for belonging to the LGBTQ+ community.  From 
its inception, the federal government stigmatized the existence of LGBTQ+ 
individuals and relationships.152  State governments have been equally, if not 
more, heinous, going so far as to criminalize same-sex sexual acts and dispar-
age LGBTQ+ relationships.153  Many states explicitly prohibited marriage be-
tween individuals of the same sex, which placed same-sex relationships on a 
lower tier than heterosexual relationships.154  Out of all of the three branches 
of the federal government, the judiciary has progressed LGBTQ+ rights the 
most through its interpretation of Title VII, especially in the early twenty-first 
century.155 
There is a range of protection for LGBTQ+ individuals at the federal and 
state levels.  This Section looks at current federal enactments and laws that 
protect LGBTQ+ individuals from discrimination before analyzing Missouri’s 
enacted protections.  Federal protections are examined first because there has 
 
 147. 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 148. 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 149. Id. at 121. 
 150. 850 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 151. See Julie Moreu, Federal Court Ruling Hailed ‘Huge Victory’ for Gay Work-
ers, NBC NEWS (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/federal-
court-ruling-hailed-huge-victory-gay-workers-n851681. 
 152. For example, President Dwight D. Eisenhower issued an executive order ban-
ning LGBTQ+ individuals from working in the federal government because they were 
a security risk.  LGBT Rights Milestones Fast Facts, supra note 11.  President Clinton 
signed “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” the military policy directive that prohibited openly 
LGBTQ+ members from serving in the military, and the Defense of Marriage Act, 
which excluded same-sex couples from marriage before any state prohibited it.  Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. See id. 
 155. See id. 
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been action by the United States Supreme Court that invalidated some of Mis-
souri’s LGBTQ+ laws. 
1. Federal Protections 
At the federal level, both the legislative and executive branches have 
made little to no progress in protecting the LGBTQ+ community.  The Equality 
Act of 1974,156 the first sexual orientation rights bill to address discrimination 
based on sexual orientation, and its later progenies, the Employment Non-Dis-
crimination Act157 and the Equality Act,158 have all been unsuccessful.  As of 
April 2019, no federally-enacted law explicitly prohibits discrimination on the 
basis of gender identity or sexual orientation. 
 
 156. H.R. 14752, 93d Cong. (1974).  This bill, known as the Equality Act of 1974, 
made it to the Judiciary Committee but ultimately was never brought up for considera-
tion.  See Catherine Y. Kim, Presidential Legitimacy Through the Anti-Discrimination 
Lens, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 207, 213 (2016).  It did not include protections for 
transgender individuals.  See id.  Several other similar bills were introduced but none 
succeeded.  See id.; Jerome Hunt, A History of the Employment Non-Discrimination 
Act, CTR. AM. PROGRESS (July 19, 2011), https://www.americanprogress.org/is-
sues/lgbt/news/2011/07/19/10006/a-history-of-the-employment-non-discrimination-
act/. 
 157. The Employment Non-Discrimination Act (“ENDA”) was first introduced in 
1994 and had a limited scope to protect individuals from discrimination, focusing solely 
on employment discrimination.  Hunt, supra note 156.  ENDA was repeatedly reintro-
duced at almost every congressional session from 1994 until 2015 but never came up 
for a Senate vote after 1996.  Dana Beyer, EDNA (Employment Non-Discrimination 
Act) Redux: Its History and Importance for All of Us, HUFFINGTON POST (May 1, 2013), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/dana-beyer/employment-non-discrimination-act-
transgender_b_3186793.html.  It first started out by providing protection from discrim-
ination on the basis of sexual orientation, but in 2007, it expanded to include gender 
identity as well.  Hunt, supra note 156. 
 158. In 2017, the Equality Act replaced ENDA.  The Equality Act, HUMAN RIGHTS 
CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/resources/the-equality-act (last visited Mar. 12, 2019).  
Its introduction widened the scope to prohibit all discrimination – not just employment 
– on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.  Id.  If passed, the Equality Act 
will amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other civil rights laws by adding sexual 
orientation and gender identity as protected characteristics of sex.  Id.  The bill not only 
seeks to add gender identity and sexual orientation to its definition of sex but also in-
cludes “sex stereotype.”  Id.  Despite skepticism, the Equality Act has the best legisla-
tive chance so far as it has the greatest total numbers of co-sponsors of any other equal-
ity act.  See id. 
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The executive branch has fared a little better over the years, waning back 
and forth on executive orders,159 EEOC policies,160 and Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”) policies161 that provided various levels of protection against discrim-
ination.  There is currently discord in the executive branch in this area, as var-
ious policies are at odds.162 
 
 159. Presidents Bill Clinton and Barrack Obama passed executive acts to provide 
some protection for federal employees.  President Clinton amended Executive Order 
11478 to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the federal civilian 
work force in 1998.  Statement by the President, OFF. OF PRESS SEC’Y (May 28, 1998), 
https://clintonwhitehouse6.archives.gov/1998/05/1998-05-28-statement-on-amend-
ment-to-eeo-executive-order.html.  President Clinton was explicit that this did not grant 
the right to proceed before the EEOC.  Id.  In 2014, President Barack Obama issued 
Executive Order 13672 to amend 11478 to also prohibit discrimination on the basis of 
gender identity.  Exec. Order No. 13672, 79 C.F.R. 42791 (2014). 
 160. Courts are not bound by the EEOC’s recognitions, and the EEOC cannot force 
a private employer to stop discrimination; however, in cases of discrimination by the 
federal government to federal employees, the EEOC can issue legally binding deci-
sions.  The Phoenix, The Implications of Macy v. Holder, SUSAN’S PLACE 
TRANSGENDER RES. (Mar. 3, 2015), https://www.susans.org/2015/03/03/the-meaning-
of-macy-v-holder/. 
 161. During the Obama administration, then-Attorney General Eric Holder an-
nounced that the DOJ would interpret “sex” to include gender identity, expressly in-
cluding transgender status, under prohibited discrimination under Title VII.  Eric 
Holder, Attorney General Holder Directs Department to Include Gender Identity Un-
der Sex Discrimination Employment Claims, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Dec. 18, 2014) 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-holder-directs-department-include-
gender-identity-under-sex-discrimination.  This was undone by the Trump administra-
tion’s former Attorney General Jeff Sessions, who sent out a memo stating that “Title 
VII does not prohibit discrimination based on gender identity per se” and that the DOJ 
would no longer interpret Title VII as such.  Memorandum from the Attorney General, 
to United States Attorneys Heads of Department Components (Oct. 4, 2017) (italics 
omitted), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4067383/Attachment-2.pdf.  
The memo was released the same week that President Trump tweeted that transgender 
individuals would no longer be able to serve in the U.S. military.  See Donald Trump 
(@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26, 2017, 8:55AM EST), https://twit-
ter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/890193981585444864; Donald Trump (@real-
DonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26, 2017, 9:04 AM EST), https://twitter.com/real-
DonaldTrump/status/890196164313833472; Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), 
TWITTER (July 26, 2017, 9:08 AM EST), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/sta-
tus/890197095151546369. 
 162. The DOJ under President Donald Trump’s administration has been in conflict 
with the EEOC regarding sexual orientation as discrimination on the basis of sex.  The 
DOJ filed an amicus brief in Zarda v. Altitude Express Inc., arguing that discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation is not discrimination on the basis of sex under Title 
VII.  See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 
2017 WL 3277292 (2d Cir. 2017).  This brief’s arguments directly conflicted with ar-
guments in the EEOC’s amicus brief.  See Alison Frankel, 2nd Circuit Demolishes Key 
DOJ Argument Against Workplace Protection for Gays, REUTERS (Feb. 26, 2018), 
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Similar to the legislative and executive branches, judicial interpretations 
have varied on accepting sexual orientation and gender identity within Title 
VII’s protection.  Despite the limbo, there has been a steady stream of progress 
in promoting LGBTQ+ rights.  In 2003, the United States Supreme Court in-
validated state laws criminalizing same-sex sexual conduct in Lawrence v. 
Texas.163  The Court noted that although individuals were not often – if ever – 
prosecuted under these laws, the laws still had a negative effect on the 
LGBTQ+ community: “When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the 
law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject ho-
mosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and private sphere.”164 
Less than two decades after decriminalizing same-sex sex, the United 
States Supreme Court once again progressed the nation forward when it held 
in Obergefell v. Hodges165 that same-sex couples are entitled to the right to 
marry.166  Subsequently, any state law holding otherwise is invalid.  The Court 
also considered that by not recognizing same-sex couples, the law created a 
hierarchy of relationships, essentially creating a stigma that same-sex couples 
are lesser than their heterosexual counterparts, which is impermissible.167  Fur-
ther, as mentioned in Part III, several circuits are on the same wavelength and 
have prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender 
identity using a sex stereotyping theory.168 
Notwithstanding the ground-breaking progression towards LGBTQ+ 
equality by the judiciary, the federal and state legislatures have not kept up.  
After criminalizing LGBTQ+ relations for thirty plus years, Congress still de-
clines to put any protective measures in place to counteract years of criminal-
ized status.  Congress has also vehemently refused to protect the LGBTQ+ 
community from the discrimination it has helped foster through its stigmatiza-
tion of LGBTQ+ individuals and relationships.  As of 2019, the executive 
branch is no ally to the LGBTQ+ community;169 however, the judicial branch 
is moving past the DOJ’s lack of recognition, and courts are implementing pro-
tections from discrimination.170  While the progress has been slow, both the 
legislature and the executive branch need to enact comprehensive policies and 
 
https://www.reuters.com/article/legal-us-otc-titlevii/2nd-circuit-demolishes-key-doj-
argument-against-workplace-protection-for-gays-idUSKCN1GA2OY. 
 163. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 164. Id. at 575. 
 165. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 166. Id. at 2608. 
 167. Id. at 2590. 
 168. See Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 112 (2d Cir. 2018) (“We 
now conclude that sexual orientation is motivated, at least in part, by sex and is thus a 
subset of sex discrimination.”); Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. Of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 
351–52 (7th Cir. 2017) (“We hold . . . that a person who alleges that she experienced 
employment discrimination on the basis of her sexual orientation has put forth a case 
of sex discrimination for Title VII purposes.”). 
 169. See supra notes 13, 161–62. 
 170. See LGBT Rights Milestones Fast Facts, supra note 11. 
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reforms to provide protection to the LGBTQ+ community.  Currently, the ju-
diciary is the best branch to continue promoting LGTBQ+ rights in light of the 
political strife in the legislative and executive branches. 
2. Missouri Protections 
There is currently no express protection at the state level for any of the 
160,000+ self-identifying LGBTQ+ Missourians from employment discrimi-
nation – or any discrimination – on the basis of their actual or perceived sexual 
orientation or gender identity.171  In this gap, Missouri municipalities have 
stepped up to the plate.  As of 2013, eighteen municipalities have enacted or-
dinances prohibiting discrimination based on gender identity or sexual orien-
tation.172  These municipalities, located within Columbia, Kansas City, and St. 
Louis, only account for twenty-seven percent of the state’s workforce173 and 
do not provide coverage to as many individuals as a state law would provide.174 
Protective bills have been introduced in both the House of Representa-
tives and the Senate in Missouri in every session since 2001, but the legislature 
has failed to capitalize on multiple attempts to include the LGBTQ+ commu-
nity expressly within the MHRA.175  The most promising piece of legislation 
introduced is the Missouri Non-Discrimination Act (“MONA”), which was 
first introduced in 1998.176  In 2013, MONA passed the Senate with bipartisan 
support but died in the House because the representatives refused to take it up 
for a vote.177  Once again, in 2016, similar House and Senate bills were intro-
duced, proposing additions to include gender identity and sexual orientation 
protections to the MHRA, but they ultimately failed.178 
The lack of comprehensive state-level protections is one of the reasons 
why Missouri’s capital, Jefferson City, received a zero out of one-hundred in 
the Municipality Equality Index compiled by the Human Rights Campaign in 
 
 171. Missouri’s Equality Profile, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, 
http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality_maps/profile_state/MO (last visited Mar. 12, 2019); 
Non-Discrimination Laws, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, 
http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/non_discrimination_laws/employment (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2019). 
 172. Henrion, supra note 79, at 1177. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Christy Mallory, Sarah Liebowitz & Amira Hasenbush, Employment, Hous-
ing, and Public Accommodations Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation and 
Gender Identity in Missouri, WILLIAMS INST. 1 (Sept. 2013), https://williamsinsti-
tute.law.ucla.edu/research/discrimination/mo-discrim-report-nov-2013/ (click link for 
full report). 
 175. Id. at 5. 
 176. Henrion, supra note 79, at 1177. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 1177–78. 
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October 2017.179  The scoring of over 500 cities across the United States com-
pared city law and policies to measure inequality the LGBTQ+ community 
faces nationwide.180  Jefferson City is one of eleven cities not to score a single 
point.181 
Missouri’s executive branch, like the legislature, has made little impact 
on the progress of LGBTQ+ rights.  In 2010, then-Governor Jay Nixon issued 
an executive order forbidding state executive agencies to discriminate on the 
basis of sexual orientation, but it did not include gender identity.182  In 2018, 
the executive branch administration made no affirmative moves to protect or 
limit LGBTQ+ rights.  Former Governor Eric Greitens made it known he op-
posed legislation that extends discrimination law to protect against sexual ori-
entation or gender identity because it would increase discrimination litiga-
tion.183  Governor Mike Parson has asserted he does not support the LGBTQ+ 
community184 and blocked MONA as a Missouri State Senator in 2016.185 
Judicially, LGBTQ+ rights have not fared much better in Missouri pri-
marily because courts have given large deference to legislative intent.  In 2015, 
sexual orientation was held not to be a cognizable claim under the MHRA in 
Pittman v. Cook Paper Recycling Corp.186  In 2017, gender identity followed 
the same demise in the appellate opinion of R.M.A. v. Blue Springs R-IV School 
District.187 
In Pittman, an employee, James Pittman, brought suit against his former 
employer, alleging his sexual orientation was a contributing factor in his ter-
mination in violation of the MHRA’s prohibition of sex discrimination.188  The 
trial court found Pittman brought a claim based on sexual orientation, not dis-
crimination on the basis of sex, and subsequently dismissed the claim.189  On 
 
 179. HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, MUNICIPAL EQUALITY INDEX 55, http://as-
sets2.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/MEI-2017-FullReport.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 
2019). 
 180. Id. at 10. 
 181. Id. at 12. 
 182. Mallory, Liebowitz & Hasenbush, supra note 174, at 5. 
 183. Jason Hancock, Breaking Down the Missouri Governor’s Race on Key Issues, 
KANSAS CITY STAR (Nov. 4, 2016), http://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-govern-
ment/article112525852.html.  
 184. Opinion, ‘I Don’t Support Them’: Gov. Parson’s Views on ‘The Homosexual 
Issue’ Are Cause for Concern, KAN. CITY STAR (June 5, 2018), https://www.kansas-
city.com/opinion/editorials/article212610554.html. 
 185. Sean Mandell, Missouri LGBT Non-Discrimination Act Faces ‘A Lot of Op-
position’, Says GOP Lawmaker, TOWLEROAD (Feb. 2, 2016), 
http://www.towleroad.com/2016/02/301400/.  His opposition to MONA seems to stem 
from the belief that providing discrimination protection to LGBTQ+ individuals would 
in fact infringe on Christian’s rights.  Id. 
 186. 478 S.W.3d 479, 485 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015). 
 187. See 477 S.W.3d 185, 190 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015), rev’d on other grounds No. SC 
96683, 2019 WL 925511 (Mo. Feb. 26, 2019) (en banc). 
 188. Pittman, 478 S.W.3d at 482. 
 189. Id. at 481. 
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appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District held the 
MHRA’s prohibition on sex-based discrimination did not extend to sexual ori-
entation.190  It found the language of the MHRA statute “clear and unambigu-
ous.”191  It also looked to legislative intent, determining that if the Missouri 
legislature wanted sexual orientation discrimination prohibited, it had the op-
portunity to do so.192   Because at the time Pittman was decided the Missouri 
legislature had not prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation, the 
court followed suit.193  The Missouri Supreme Court declined to review the 
judgment.194 
Shortly after, gender identity was also found not to be within the MHRA’s 
protection; however, this fact is in limbo after a rehearing of R.M.A. in 2019.  
In 2017, the Western District held in R.M.A. that discrimination based on an 
individual’s gender identity, in particular a “transitioning status,” is not pro-
tected under the MHRA, as it is not unique to one gender.195  R.M.A. was a 
high school male who was denied access to the boy’s locker room because he 
was “alleged to have female genitalia.”196  R.M.A. was a transgender male who 
aligned his gender identity with his true identity rather than the one assigned 
to him at birth.197  The court held the Missouri legislature did not intend sex-
based discrimination to prohibit denial to public accommodations because of 
an individual’s transitioning status and affirmed the trial court’s dismissal.198   
R.M.A. was originally denied transfer to the Missouri Supreme Court, but 
the court changed its mind; R.M.A. was transferred on January 23, 2018, and 
reversed on different grounds.199  The court did not reach the issue of gender 
identity under the MHRA, rather it analyzed if ultimate facts were alleged to 
satisfy a claim.200  It created an example verdict director of how the ultimate 
facts would be presented to a jury, then it applied the facts alleged to the direc-
tor.201  Concluding that all of the elements of the verdict director were alleged, 
it found the trial court should not have dismissed the case because “at this stage 
of the proceedings, that is all that is required.”202  While the court’s finding 
 
 190. Id. at 483. 
 191. Id. at 482. 
 192. Id. at 483. 
 193. Id. 
 194. See generally id. 
 195. R.M.A. v. Blue Springs R-IV Sch. Dist., 2017 WL 3026757, at *8–9 (Mo. Ct. 
App. July 18, 2017), rev’d on other grounds No. SC 96683, 2019 WL 925511 (Mo. 
Feb. 26, 2019) (en banc). 
 196. Id. at *7. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at *9. 
 199. R.M.A. v. Blue Springs R-IV Sch. Dist., 2019 WL 925511, at *1 (Mo. Feb. 
26, 2019) (en banc). 
 200. Id. at *3. 
 201. Id. at *2–3. 
 202. Id. at *5. 
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does overturn the Western District’s opinion, it leaves the LGBTQ+ commu-
nity back at square one with no express protection. 
Besides both Pittman and R.M.A. resulting in unfortunate losses for the 
LGBTQ+ community, both cases foreshadowed Lampley’s holding.  Pittman 
relied on several federal cases that utilized sex stereotyping to bring sex dis-
crimination claims.203  However, Pittman himself did not raise a sex stereotyp-
ing claim in his petition.204  Subsequently, the court discussed sex stereotyping 
claims, but it declined to rule whether the MHRA prohibits discrimination on 
the basis of sex under a sex stereotyping theory.205  Similarly, R.M.A. did not 
utilize a sex stereotyping theory at trial but tried to assert it on appeal.206   
D. Gender Equality in the Law – Fourth Wave Feminist Approach 
Historically, the feminist movement has not been supportive of any iden-
tities outside of cisgender white women.207  During its first push for equality, 
white women sacrificed the rights of women of color to gain the right to vote.  
When the Equality Rights Amendment was facing opposition, feminist move-
ments abandoned women in the LGBTQ+ community, deeming them “political 
liabilities,” in order to advance other agendas.208  Feminist movements have 
stepped on the backs of transgender individuals to promote progression for 
people who identify as cisgender, which has translated to modern feminism.209  
Currently, there is still heavy pushback from subgroups of radical feminism,210 
 
 203. See Appellant’s Reply Brief at 6, Pittman v. Cook Paper Recycling Corp., 478 
S.W.3d 479 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (No. WD77973), 2015 WL 1867551, at *6. 
 204. Pittman, 478 S.W.3d at 484. 
 205. Id. 
 206. R.M.A., 2017 WL 3026757 at *8. 
 207. Feminism has historically been white-centered, focusing and emphasizing is-
sues that are pertinent to White women, while ignoring intersectional identities that 
affect minority women.  For example, a commonly used illustration of gender inequal-
ity is the pay wage gap.  The common assertion is that a woman makes seventy-seven 
cents to each dollar a man makes; however, this is only true for White women.  The 
Simple Truth About the Gender Pay Gap, AM. ASS’N UNIV. WOMEN, 
https://www.aauw.org/research/the-simple-truth-about-the-gender-pay-gap/ (last vis-
ited Mar. 13, 2019).  Black women make sixty-one cents, while Latinx women make 
fifty-three cents.  Id. 
 208. Franklin, supra note 1, at 118.  Even Ginsburg disavowed the connection be-
tween sex equality and LGBTQ+ rights in 1979 in an attempt to revive the ERA from 
defeat.  Id. at 140. 
 209. Kelsie Brynn Jones, Trans-Exclusionary Radical Feminism: What Exactly Is 
It, And Why Does It Hurt?, HUFFINGTON POST, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/kelsie-
brynn-jones/transexclusionary-radical-terf_b_5632332.html (last updated Feb. 2, 
2016). 
 210. Many feminists do not consider TERFs as fellow feminists.  See, e.g., Linda 
Yang, Raquel Willis: TERFs Don’t Deserve to Define Themselves as Feminists, 
BROADLY (Mar. 9, 2018), https://broadly.vice.com/en_us/article/wj4mn5/raquel-wil-
lis-terfs-dont-deserve-to-define-themselves-as-feminists. 
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such as groups considered Trans-Exclusive Radical Feminists – commonly 
known as TERFs211 – who wish to reinforce the gender binary and erase 
transgender individuals from the equality narrative.212  Nationally, there is still 
a lack of transgender inclusivity into large-scale movements and demonstra-
tions.213 
Applied feminism and feminist movements have not been entirely sup-
portive of the rest of the LGBTQ+ community and other intersecting identities 
outside of the cisgender white heterosexual female perspective.  Despite these 
egregious missteps, feminists can move forward in the fourth wave to include 
all women and genders in their narrative for equality, not just for those who fit 
the cisgender white heterosexual categories, by accounting for intersectional 
identities when pushing for policy movement.  Each person is made up of a 
variety of identities and advancing only one identity at the expense of the others 
will never lead to true equality.  Recently, strides have been made in the federal 
system and in Missouri with the Lampley decision to protect vulnerable iden-
tities by prohibiting discrimination against individuals for not fitting stereotyp-
ical gender conformities. 
IV. INSTANT DECISION 
In Lampley, as a matter of first impression, the Missouri Supreme 
Court ultimately held in favor of Lampley.214  However, the Lampley opinion 
itself reflects that serious discord existed among the judges in reaching a hold-
ing.  Four opinions were filed: a principal, a concurrence, a partial concurrence 
and partial dissent,215 and a dissent.216  Five judges found for Lampley but 
 
 211. The name TERF itself is controversial.  The majority find the description fit-
ting, while some consider it a slur.  See Colleen Flaherty, ‘Terf’ War, INSIDE HIGHER 
ED (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/08/29/philosophers-
object-journals-publication-terf-reference-some-feminists-it-really. 
 212. See Jones, supra note 209. 
 213. This includes the Women’s March.  See Meredith Talusan, We’ve Always Been 
Nasty, THEM (Jan. 21, 2018), https://www.them.us/story/weve-always-been-nasty; 
Katelyn Burns, The Women’s March Movement is Trying – But Still Struggling – to 
Center Trans Voices, ESTABLISHMENT (Nov. 3, 2017), https://theestablishment.co/the-
womens-march-movement-is-trying-but-still-struggling-to-center-trans-voices-
3094667c9f24. 
 214. Lampley v. Mo. Comm’n on Human Rights, No. SC 96828, 2019 WL 925557 
(Mo. Feb. 26, 2019) (en banc). 
 215. Chief Justice Zel M. Fischer wrote a brief opinion concurring in part and dis-
senting in part.   Id. at *13 (Fischer, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  He 
concurred on three points: (1) discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is not 
covered by the MHRA; (2) an administrative action should be reviewed as a non-con-
tested case; (3) and Lampley and Frost failed to comply with Rule 94.   Id.   Then, he 
expressed where he diverged from the principal: “The failure to follow Rule 94 is where 
the resolution of this case should begin and end.”  Id.  
 216. Judge W. Brent Powell wrote the sole dissent.  Id. at *14 (Powell, J., dissent-
ing).  He found the case must be dismissed because the trial court did not follow Rule 
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reached this determination in two factions.  The principal opinion, authored by 
Judge George W. Draper III and concurred in by Judge Patricia Breckenridge 
and Judge Laura Denvir Stith, focused on federal precedent and sex stereotyp-
ing as a method to evidence sex discrimination.217  The concurrence, authored 
by Judge Paul C. Wilson and concurred in by Judge Mary R. Russell, empha-
sized the sufficiency of the ultimate facts to satisfy the pleading requirements 
for sex discrimination claims.218  In reaching their conclusions, both majority 
opinions provided several nuances in their analyses that will shape future sex 
discrimination litigation.  This Section analyzes the Lampley decision in two 
main parts: This Section first reviews the principal and then examines the con-
currence.  
A. Majority 
 The principal concluded that MCHR erred when it dismissed Lamp-
ley’s claim for lack of jurisdiction and then reversed the trial court decision and 
remanded the case with instructions to grant right-to-sue letters.219  It reached 
its conclusion by first addressing a procedural issue on appeal before flushing 
out the sex discrimination claim using a two-prong approach.  The first prong 
examined the applicability of Pittman.  The second prong laid the foundation 
for sex stereotyping as a way to evidence sex discrimination.  
Before addressing the crux of the case, the principal addressed a pro-
cedural issue that arose on appeal.220  MCHR argued on appeal that the case 
was “procedurally deficient”221 because Lampley and Frost failed to follow 
strict adherence to proper writ procedure for judicial review.222  The principal 
did not find this persuasive.  Because neither party – nor the trial court – ques-
tioned the procedure posture, the relevant precedent had not yet been estab-
lished when Lampley filed.223  Because the court noted that “addressing 
 
14 and “issue a preliminary writ before denying mandamus relief.”  Id.  However, even 
if the case is allowed to proceed, the trial court’s decision should still be affirmed be-
cause (1) “a court cannot compel the executive director [of the MCHR] to exercise her 
discretion so as to reach a particular result”; (2) the particulars of the complaint suggest 
discrimination because he was gay; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion.  
Id. at 20 (emphasis omitted).  
 217. Id. at *1–7. 
 218. Id. at *8–13.  
 219. Id. at *7. 
 220. See id. at *3. 
 221. Id.  
 222. Id. at *2–3.  The main accusation was that Lampley and Frost failed to follow 
Rule 94.  Id.  In the review of an administrative procedure, the role of the judiciary is 
limited based on whether the administrative procedure was contested or non-contested.  
Id. at *2.  Lampley and Frost sought a mandamus review of a non-contested case.  Id.  
 223. The principal analyzed two cases, Tivol Plaza Inc. v. Missouri Commission on 
Human Rights, 527 S.W.3d 837 (Mo. 2017) (en banc) and Bartlett v. Missouri Depart-
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charges of sex discrimination based upon sexual stereotyping evidence [wa]s 
an important issue [it] ha[d] not addressed,” the court used its discretion to 
allow the matter to proceed despite any procedural deficiencies.224  
The principal then examined the “important issue” in front of the 
court: the sex discrimination claim.  It noted that appellate courts “are guided 
by both Missouri law and by federal employment discrimination (i.e., Title VII) 
case law that is consistent with Missouri law” when reviewing a case under the 
MHRA.225  Further, it stated that the MHRA “should be construed liberally to 
include those cases [that] are within the spirit of the law.”226  Immediately 
thereafter it began its two-prong approach and addressed the trial court’s reli-
ance on Pittman.  Pittman found that “[the MHRA] does not prohibit discrim-
ination on the basis of sexual orientation.”227  The trial court interpreted and 
extended Pittman’s rationale to exclude discrimination claims based on sex 
stereotyping because – like sexual orientation – sex stereotyping is not explic-
itly covered in the MHRA.228  However, the principal found Pittman “pro-
vide[d] no support for the [MCHR’s] decision” and the Pittman court declined 
to address sex stereotyping because it was not at issue.229  Regardless, “Lamp-
ley and Frost[’s claims] specifically stated they were discriminated against on 
the basis of sex because Lampley did not conform to generally sexual stereo-
types” and did not state that they were discriminated against on the basis of 
sexual orientation.230  Lampley’s sexual orientation was incidental to the com-
plaints filed – it did not form the basis of those complaints.  For that reason, 
the principal held that the trial court’s reliance on and interpretation of Pittman 
was erroneous.231  
Next, the principal reiterated that Lampley and Frost both alleged sex 
decimation based on Lampley’s non-stereotypical attributes and that Lamp-
ley’s sexual orientation was “incidental to the basis for discrimination”232 be-
fore relaying relevant law and precedent.233  After laying out the elements of a 
 
ment of Insurance, 528 S.W.3d 911 (Mo. 2017) (en banc), about failure to follow ap-
propriate writ procedure.   Id.   Both cases were handed down on the same day in 2017. 
Id. at *3.  Lampley and Frost sought their petition in 2015.  Id. at *4.  Because the 
guidance of the court was not yet available when they filed, the court decided it would 
“not penalize them for failing to follow precedent not established at the time.”  Id.  
 224. Id.  
 225. Id. (quoting Diaz v. Autozoners, L.L.C., 484 S.W.3d 64,76 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2015)). 
 226. Id.  
 227. Id. (citing Pittman v. Cook Paper Recycling Corp., 478 S.W.3d 479, 485 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2015)). 
 228. Id. at *5.  
 229. Id. 
 230. Id.  
 231. Id.  
 232. Id.  
 233. Id. at *5–6.  
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prima facie case of discrimination, it noted that the fourth prong234 may be 
satisfied by “some other evidence that would give rise to an interference of 
unlawful discrimination” and that sex stereotyping can give rise to that infer-
ence.235  Price Waterhouse was then highlighted.236   
The principal found the holdings of Price Waterhouse and its federal 
circuit court successors to be evident: Sex stereotyping can be utilized to evi-
dence sex discrimination by individuals with non-stereotypical attributes, like 
feminine men.237  It recognized that when employers make decision based on 
a sex stereotypes, “it is clear” that employer “is engaging in sex discrimination 
because the discrimination would not occur but for the victim’s sex.”238  In fact, 
the principal found that because “[the MCHR]’s promulgated rules already 
characterize sexual stereotyping as an unlawful hiring practice, it follows that 
sexual stereotyping during employment is an unlawful employment prac-
tice.”239  
Thereafter, it quoted federal precedent, which states that “gay, lesbian, 
and bisexual individuals do not have less protection under Price Waterhouse 
against traditional gender stereotype discrimination than do heterosexual indi-
viduals,” but these characteristics alone are not enough to support a sex stere-
otyping claim.240  The principal reasoned that federal courts have found a dis-
tinction between discrimination based on sexual orientation and sex discrimi-
nation as evidenced by sex stereotyping and further reasoned that the same 
standard that applies to heterosexual individuals must also apply to homosex-
ual individuals “who allege discrimination based upon their failure to conform 
to sex-stereotypes.”241  It concluded that “[s]exual orientation is incidental and 
irrelevant to sex stereotyping.  Sex discrimination is discrimination, it is pro-
hibited by the [MHRA], and an employee may demonstrate this discrimination 
through evidence of sexual stereotyping.”242 
After its analysis, the principal found that the MCHR “unreasonably 
and erroneously assumed that because Lampley was homosexual, there was no 
possible sex discrimination claim other than one for sexual orientation” and 
further found that the MCHR prematurely concluded its investigation.243  The 
trial court’s conclusion was also incorrect, thus the court reversed and re-
manded with instructions to issue right-to-sue-letters.244  
 
 234. Id. at *5. 
 235. Id. at *5–6. 
 236. Id. at *6. 
 237. See id.  
 238. Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted).  
 239. Id. at *7.  
 240. Id. at *6 (alteration in original) (quoting Christiansen v. Omnicom Group, Inc., 
852 F.3d 195, 200–01 (2d. Cir. 2017)).  
 241. Id.  
 242. Id. at *7 (emphasis added).  
 243. Id.   
 244. Id.  The MCHR is limited to 180 days to process a filed complaint, and once 
that limitation is expired, the MCHR must issue a right-to-sue letter.  Id.  Because more 
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B. Concurrence 
While reaching the same conclusion, the concurrence traversed the is-
sue in a completely different manner.  Instead of discussing sex stereotyping, 
the concurrence determined “[t]h[e] case should be analyzed and disposed of 
entirely on the basis of whether the facts alleged by claimants assert sex dis-
crimination claims covered by the MHRA.”245  During its analysis, the concur-
rence relied on R.M.A. v. Blue Springs R-IV School District, which was handed 
down on the same day as Lampley.246  The concurrence used the language in 
R.M.A. to make the distinction that there are no “types” of sex discrimination 
under the MHRA, but there are different ways to prove a claim.247  In Lampley, 
the concurrence declined to determine if sex stereotyping is one of those ways 
because, in its view, the ultimate facts alleged were sufficient to prove sex dis-
crimination under the MHRA.248 
The concurrence found the true question at issue was “whether [Lamp-
ley and Frost] . . . pleaded sufficient ultimate (not merely evidentiary) facts to 
state claims under the MHRA.”249  Once again relying on R.M.A., the concur-
rence determined that allegations of ultimate facts are the only facts re-
quired.250  After reciting the applicable statute,251 the concurrence looked to a 
“reliable place” – the corresponding verdict director that would be given if the 
matter went to a jury – to determine the ultimate fact at issue.252  Based off its 
determination that Missouri Approved Instruction 38.01(a) would be the ap-
propriate verdict director, the concurrence created an example verdict director 
to evaluate the validity of Lampley’s claims.253  From there the concurrence 
 
than 180 days had passed by the time the instant opinion was handed down, the appro-
priate remedy was the issuance of a right-to-sue letter.  Id.  
 245. Id. at *8 (Wilson, J., concurring). 
 246. Id.  
 247. Id.  
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. at *9. 
 250. Id. at *10. 
 251. Id. (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 213.055 (2016)). 
 252. Id.  
 253. Id.  The example the concurrence created is as follows: 
 
Your verdict must be for plaintiff [Lampley] if you believe: 
 
First, defendant [Employer] discriminated against plaintiff with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, and 
 
Second, plaintiff’s male sex was a contributing factor in such discrimination, 
and 
 
Third, as a direct result of such conduct, plaintiff sustained damage. 
 
Id. (citation omitted). 
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used a “simple and straightforward analysis.”254  It determined the four ulti-
mate facts required for this matter: “(1) [Lampley] suffered an act of discrimi-
nation prohibited by 213.55; (2) he is member of a protected class, i.e., male; 
(3) causation, i.e., his male sex was a contributing factor (or motivating factor) 
in that discrimination and (4) damages.”255  
It found that all four elements were satisfied by statements in Lamp-
ley’s amended charge.256  The first ultimate fact was satisfied by specific alle-
gations of discriminatory treatment.257  The second was satisfied when Lamp-
ley stated, “I am a male . . . .”258  The third was satisfied when he alleged the 
hostile work environment was created on the basis of his sex, and the fourth 
was satisfied with specific allegations of fiscal and emotional damage.259  Be-
cause all four of the elements were alleged by sufficient ultimate facts, the con-
currence concluded that the MCHR and the trial court erred.260  It then followed 
a similar analysis for Frost’s claims, and held that she, too, could satisfy all of 
the elements required because she sufficiently alleged ultimate facts.261   
Before concluding, the concurrence made it known that the analysis 
of sex discrimination should stop there because the issue at hand “c[ould] be 
disposed of entirely as a routine application of pleading standards.”262  For that 
reason, the concurrence maintained that the principal should have ended its 
determination before considering “other issues such as whether Pittman . . . 
was wrongly decided and whether discrimination can be proved by evidence 
of ‘sex stereotyping.’”263  But ultimately, it joined the principal in its conclu-
sion and agreed “that the judgment of the [trial] court must be reversed and the 
case remanded for further proceedings.”264 
V. COMMENT 
In Lampley v. Missouri Commission on Human Rights, the Missouri Su-
preme Court made a positive contribution to the LGBTQ+ rights movement 
when it held that the discrimination on the basis of stereotypes is a manifesta-
tion of sex-based discrimination.265  If wielded correctly, Missourians can uti-
lize the sex stereotyping theory to protect themselves from discrimination on 
the basis of gender identity or sexual orientation if either their identity, orien-
tation, or both do not conform to typically held gender stereotypes.  Until 
 
 254. Id. at *13. 
 255. Id. at *10. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id.  
 258. Id. at *11. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id.  
 261. Id. at *12. 
 262. Id. at *11. 
 263. Id.  
 264. Id. at *13. 
 265. Id. at *5. 
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Lampley, protections for the LGBTQ+ community at the state level seemed 
bleak, as the Missouri government has not been the most favorable to the com-
munity.  
 Both majority findings in Lampley are a step towards advancing legal 
protections to ensure gender equality in the workplace.  The concurrence’s sim-
ple and straightforward approach may provide protection because, more likely 
than not, if an individual is being discriminated against because of her sexual 
orientation or gender identity, the claim can boil down to the individual being 
discriminated against on the basis of sex.  However, this has not been success-
ful thus far.  The more impactful of the two will probably be the principal’s sex 
stereotyping approach. 
For example, the plaintiff in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, Ann Hopkins, 
defied stereotypes.  Ann was a strong, aggressive, intelligent woman seeking a 
leadership position at work.266  She was discriminated against because her gen-
der did not fit the stereotypical norm of what her employers thought it should 
be.267  Ann could have been transgender, cisgender, lesbian, pansexual, heter-
osexual, or any combination of a gender identity and a sexual orientation and 
still looked and acted the exact same.  The United States Supreme Court has 
expressed it does not want to create special rights for the LGBTQ+ community, 
but it does not want them to be excluded from anything.268  If Ann was granted 
protection as a heterosexual woman,269 so should a transgender Ann, a lesbian 
Ann, or any other Ann.  
Although it was originally used to dispel traditional notions regarding 
men and women, it is not a stretch for Lampley to also protect the LGBTQ+ 
community.  As Justice Scalia stated, “[S]tatutory prohibitions often go beyond 
the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils.”270  The statutory prin-
ciple, as interpreted by Price Waterhouse and Lampley, aims to prohibit dis-
crimination against an individual for not conforming to gender norms.271  Dis-
crimination against the LGBTQ+ community is a comparable evil that sex dis-
crimination can cover using a sex stereotyping principal. 
Recognizing sex stereotyping as evidence of sexual discrimination will 
positively increase protection to Missourians in the workplace by eliminating 
the boundaries between genders and protecting individuals for having traits 
typically associated with one gender.  Section A of this Part analyzes Lamp-
ley’s expansion of sexual discrimination claims by protecting all gender iden-
tities.  Section B looks at the potential effects of the sex stereotyping principle 
 
 266. 490 U.S. 228, 234–35 (1989), superseded by Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 
No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized by Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 
(2014). 
 267. Id. at 235. 
 268. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996). 
 269. Ann Hopkins, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: A Personal Account of a Sexual 
Discrimination Plaintiff, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 357, 359 (2005), https://schol-
arlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1024&context=hlelj. 
 270. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998). 
 271. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251; Lampley, 2019 WL 925557, at *6. 
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to protect the identity of sexual orientation in future Missouri discrimination 
cases. 
A. Advancing Gender Equality Through Gender Inclusivity 
Feminism is the theory of the social, political, and economic equality of 
the genders.272  Unfortunately, it is often misconstrued as the advancement of 
women at the expense of men without even thinking about those falling outside 
of the binary spectrum.273  However, by its definition, that is doctrinally defec-
tive.  At its core, feminism is about advancing the equality of all genders, not 
the defeat and hatred of one gender for others to prevail: It is about putting 
them on a level base.  Justice Ginsburg recognized this notion decades ago, 
noting one gender cannot be liberated without the liberation of the others.274  
For this reason, she brought a series of sexual discrimination cases with male 
plaintiffs to challenge the idea that men, too, are punished for not conforming 
with societal expectations.275 
At the time, and throughout her tenure, Justice Ginsburg uses gender and 
sex interchangeably.276  However, it is important to reiterate that gender and 
sex are two distinctive identities, as discussed earlier in this Note.277  Gender 
and sex are two of the many intersecting identities that make up who an indi-
vidual is.  In order to reach true equality amongst individuals, one identity must 
not be advanced at the expense of the others.  So, Justice Ginsburg’s statement 
– “Fair and equal treatment for women means fair and equal treatment for 
members of [all genders]”278 – should be amended to state, “Fair and equal 
treatment [for one identity] means fair and equal treatment for members of [all 
identities].” 
Lampley’s effect will not be limited to providing protection to one gender 
but will rather serve as the stereotyping vehicle that provides protection against 
discrimination to any individual who does not conform to an employer’s ex-
pectation as to how an employee should act based on their sex assigned at birth.  
This may extend Missouri sex discrimination law to criminalize discrimination 
against transgender individuals.  This means more than 25,000 Missourians279 
may be protected from “epithets, slurs, and negative stereotyping,” and other 
 
 272. See supra Part I. 
 273. See supra Section III.D. 
 274. Franklin, supra note 1, at 123. 
 275. Id. at 84. 
 276. Catherine Crocker, Ginsburg Explains Origin of Sex, Gender: Supreme 
Court’s Newest Member Speaks at Her Old Law School and Brings Down the House 
with Her History Lesson About Fighting Bias, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 21, 1993), http://arti-
cles.latimes.com/1993-11-21/news/mn-59217_1_supreme-court. 
 277. See supra Section III.A. 
 278. Franklin, supra note 1, at 92. 
 279. ANDREW R. FLORES ET AL., HOW MANY ADULTS IDENTIFY AS TRANSGENDER 
IN THE UNITED STATES? 3 (2016), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/up-
loads/How-Many-Adults-Identify-as-Transgender-in-the-United-States.pdf. 
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forms of harassment for not “satisfying” an employer’s views of what their 
gender is and how they should represent it.280 
Currently in Missouri, it is not explicitly illegal to discriminate against a 
person based on gender identity, and recently the Missouri Supreme Court 
failed to address this issue head on.281  Before Lampley, there was no mecha-
nism for over 25,000 people to bring a claim if they were discriminated against 
based on their gender identity.282  So, a transgender individual could be refused 
service at a restaurant, denied housing, or fired because of their gender identity, 
and there would be no legal ramification to the adverse actor in Missouri.  How-
ever, sex stereotyping opens this door because the fourth element of sexual 
discrimination – being treated differently from similarly situated individuals 
outside of a protected class – could be satisfied by showing a member outside 
of the protected class would not have been treated differently for either being 
effeminate or masculine.  This is similar to the line of rationale the Sixth Circuit 
used to hold an individual’s gender identity could evidence sexual discrimina-
tion in Title VII cases in Smith v. City of Salem.283 
Sex stereotyping could provide protections to people who transcend the 
gender nonconforming individuals.  Non-binary is a gender identity that does 
not fall within the binary spectrum of gender.284  Logically, sex stereotyping 
should protect non-binary individuals from sex discrimination because they do 
not fit into the gender binaries and, consequently, their actions may not con-
form to expectations of how an employer believes they should behave.  There-
fore, sex stereotyping may be a way to show they were discriminated against.  
For example, Quinn is a non-binary individual, whose pronouns are they/them.  
At work, their employer believes Quinn should behave in a stereotypically fem-
inine manner because their gender assigned at birth – and not their true gender 
– is female.  Quinn does not perform how their employer expects them to, 
whether that is because of their pronouns, gender expressions, or behavior, and 
is discriminated against on this basis.  Therefore, Quinn is being treated differ-
ently than another similarly situated individual whose gender was assigned fe-
male at birth because they do not conform to their employer’s expectation.  
 
 280. Sex Discrimination & Harassment, supra note 85. 
 281. See R.M.A. v. Blue Springs R-IV Sch. Dist., 2019 WL 925511, at *1 (Mo. 
Feb. 26, 2019) (en banc). 
 282. Although Kansas City, St. Louis, and Columbia have passed local ordinances 
that prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender identity, they “carry little conse-
quence if violated.”  MO. PRAC. SERIES: EMP. L. & PRAC. § 4:10 n.9, West (database 
updated Nov. 2018). 
 283. 378 F.3d 566, 570, 575 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding the fourth element of prima 
facie discrimination was satisfied because the individual “would not have been treated 
differently, on account of his non-masculine behavior and [Gender Dysphoria], had he 
been a woman instead of a man”). 
 284. QMUNITY, QUEER TERMINOLOGY – FROM A TO Q 14 (2015), 
http://qmunity.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Queer_Terminology_Web_Ver-
sion__Sept_2013__Cover_and_pages_.pdf. 
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Other individuals, such as transgender men and women may use a similar ar-
gument to satisfy the fourth element of prima facie discrimination. 
The main issue with bringing claims of discrimination on the basis of sex 
using sex stereotyping to show gender identity discrimination against non-bi-
nary individuals is that few states recognize genders outside the binary, and 
Missouri is not one of them.285  However, the sex stereotyping vehicle allows 
plaintiffs to bring claims against an employer for discriminating against them 
because they do not meet the employer’s expectations.  Consequently, even if 
the state does not recognize non-binary genders, individuals can still argue they 
do not fit an employer’s stereotypical belief of how the individual should be-
have.  This is a way to provide protection until Missouri expands its definition 
of gender. 
This newly recognized manifestation of sexual discrimination creates a 
vehicle for 25,000 Missourians to potentially bring discrimination claims.  
While not explicitly doing so, this holding may have delegalized discrimination 
against transgender and non-binary individuals by allowing individuals to 
show they have been adversely acted against because they do not behave in 
accordance with the stereotype of a particular gender.  This brings Missouri up 
to speed with twenty-one other states286 and three federal circuit courts.287  Sex 
stereotyping is allowing gender inclusivity by eliminating adverse actions 
based on perceived notions of what each gender should be.  It allows freedom 
and protection for individuals to transcend gender barriers.  It protects differ-
ences rather than promotes conformity.  Because of this, it allows individuals 
who have traditionally been unprotected by the MHRA to potentially bring suit.  
Further, it allows cisgender individuals who do not meet stereotypes to bring 
claims.  By permitting all genders protection and erasing the barriers between 
 
 285. As of January 25, 2019, California, Maine, Oregon, Washington, District of 
Columbia, and New York recognize genders outside of the binary.  Josh Magness, 
Third Gender Coming to Birth Certificates in New York City, MIAMI HERALD (Oct. 9, 
2018), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/national/arti-
cle219731440.html.  However, several countries, including Canada, Germany, Paki-
stan, Bangladesh, and Australia, recognize non-binary or third gender options.  Linley 
Sanders, What Is Gender X? New Identity Is Accepted in These States, and Washington 
and Vermont Could Be Next, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 1, 2018), 
http://www.newsweek.com/gender-x-new-identity-states-washington-vermont-
775221. 
 286. “California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, [and] Washington” have 
statutes that protect against employment discrimination based on sexual orientation and 
gender identity.  State Maps of Laws & Policies, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, 
https://www.hrc.org/state-maps/employment (last updated Jan. 28, 2019). 
 287. The Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have found some type of protection in 
the Civil Rights Act.  See Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1318–19 (11th Cir. 2011); 
Smith, 378 F.3d at 575; Roberts v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 315 F. Supp. 3d (D. Nev. 
2016). 
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them, Missouri is taking a step towards gender equality through gender inclu-
sivity. 
B. Intersectional Issues Benefiting from Sex Stereotyping Recognition 
Intersectionality is the interlocking social identities – such as race, gen-
der, national origin, sexual orientation, age, and ability – that operate together 
form “complex social inequalities.”288  Gender identity is not the only intersec-
tional issue that may benefit from recognizing sex stereotyping as a manifesta-
tion of discrimination on the basis of sex.  This vehicle established in Lampley 
has the potential to be used to protect against not yet illegal discrimination 
based on intersectional categories, like sexual orientation. 
The MHRA does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orien-
tation.289  This was established via judicial interpretation in Pittman, and the 
court in Lampley believed that “sexual orientation is irrelevant” to a sexual 
discrimination claim.290  However, there is the potential for gay, lesbian, bi-
sexual, and other individuals to be protected against discrimination by using 
sex stereotyping to evidence discrimination on the basis of sex. 
Like the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) amicus brief in 
Lampley argues, any sexual orientation that is not heterosexual tends to defy 
gender stereotypes, as it is “motivated by the gender stereotype that men and 
women should act a certain way, more specifically, that men should only form 
intimate with women and women should form such relationship with men.”291  
However, in Lampley, the court held sexual orientation is “immaterial and ir-
relevant” when an employee is being mistreated because he is insufficiently 
masculine or she is insufficiently feminine.292  The court provided analogous 
cases to illustrate that federal courts, like the Second Circuit in Christiansen v. 
Omnicom Group, Inc., have held that sexual orientation can be used to evi-
dence sex stereotype claims.293  This already suggests the willingness for Mis-
souri courts to accept sexual orientation as a way to evidence sex discrimina-
tion, although this may not be enough on its own. 
Since 1998, MONA – which would amend the MHRA to include gender 
identity and sexual orientation as protected classes – has been in and out of the 
 
 288. Patricia Hill Collins, Intersectionality’s Definitional Dilemmas, 41 ANN. REV. 
SOC. 2 (Mar. 23, 2015), https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev-soc-
073014-112142. 
 289. Pittman v. Cook Paper Recycling Corp., 478 S.W.3d 479, 483 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2015). 
 290. Id. at *7 (emphasis added). 
 291. Brief of American Civil Liberties Union of Missouri Foundation as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Appellants Filed with Consent at 18, Lampley v. Missouri 
Comm’n on Human Rights, 2017 WL 4779447 (Mo. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2017) (No. WD 
80288), 2017 WL 1374157, at *18. 
 292. Lampley v. Mo. Comm’n on Human Rights, No. SC 96828, 2019 WL 925557 
(Mo. Feb. 26, 2019) (en banc). 
 293. Id. 
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Missouri legislature; however, it continually fails to pass.294  The last attempt 
was in 2016.295  In the meantime, reliance on the sex stereotyping theory may 
be one way to provide protection against adverse actions because of an indi-
vidual’s sexuality and gender identity if the claimant can show their discrimi-
nation was on the basis of their nonconformity.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Despite starting off slow, Missouri is beginning to enact more protection 
for some of its most vulnerable citizens.  By recognizing sex stereotyping as a 
manifestation of sexual discrimination, Missouri is beginning to eliminate 
some of its gender barriers in the workplace.  Lampley has unsheathed the 
sword to provide protection for all genders from stereotypical conformist re-
strictions.  It slices through discrimination to ensure the equality of the genders 
through advancing gender inclusivity.  Further, Lampley’s holding may be the 
sword for transgender individuals and potentially 160,000+ Missourians in the 
LGBTQ+ community to defend themselves from discriminatory conduct they 
were once defenseless against.296  Finally, Lampley’s landmark holding places 
Missouri in line with other states to better protect its citizens and places it on 
the right track to achieve the MCHR’s goal to protect Missourians from dis-
crimination. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 294. Henrion, supra note 79, at 1777–78. 
 295. Id. 
 296. See Missouri’s Equality Profile, supra note 171. 
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